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Kiel Working Papers are preliminary papers written by staff members of the
Kiel Institute of World Economics. Responsibility for contents and distri-
bution rests with the author. Critical comments and suggestions for im-
provements are welcome. Quotations should be cleared with the author.I. Introduction
This paper tries to investigate why Subsaharian Africa was the tail-light
of all developing areas according to its growth performance in the sixties.
During this First Development Decade Subsaharian African countries scored
an annual average rate of real GDP growth of 4.7 percent which is less than
the corresponding rate of 5.4 percent of all developing market economies and
2 less than the UN minimum target rate for this decade of 5.0 percent . It
also lags behind estimated "full employment" growth rates up to the year 2000
ever under optimistic assumptions with regard to unemployment rates during
the last quarter of this century . Whether this unsatisfactory result is mostly
due to the transition from the colonial status to independence and its costs,
to insufficient preconditions for developmental activities as far as physi-
cal and human infrastructure endowment is concerned or to the lack of domestic
as well as foreign capital funds, is open to question. Though there are
some arguments ascribing an essential role to education in the African eco-
nomic development of the sixties, in contrast to capital shortage in South
Asia and to an adverse social structure in Latin America acting as deterrents
to economic growth , private capital shortages may have also blocked the
growth process of total Subsaharian Africa, where up to now the
public sector outweighed the private sector as the major capital source
/Emerson, 1973, pp. 256-58-7, and where in many countries a net private capital
outflow was compensated by a net public capital inflow flBRD, in: Banque
Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, 1973, No 203, p. 23_7. Since the
impact of some of the above-cited obstacles to growth has to be regarded as
being intangible, if the j-'cfdss^country regression approach is applicated to
a sample of Subsaharian states, this paper is confined to the role of capital
This article is part of a research project which covers the policy of
Subsaharian African states towards private and public capital inflows. The
project is sponsored by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (SFB 86; Ham-
burg/Kiel). The author acknowledges critical comments provided by J.B.Donges,
S. Heldt, U. Hiemenz, and H. R. Kramer.
The countries and their basic performance data are recorded in the
2 appendix table l*i





in macroeconomic terms, to the various channels through which capital is
directed to African states and to its productivity. Though there are a lot
of cross-country regression investigations focusing on this topic, an ana-
lysis which concentrates on Subsaharian Africa exclusively and which identi-
fies over- and underachievers concerning the African growth path is still
2
missing, probably because of data shortages . If, however, Galbraith's hypo-
thesis that bottlenecks to growth are different with respect to specific
developing areas^ is assumed to be valid, then world-wide country samples
which are normally as fed' and in which Subsaharian countries are mostly
underrepresented do not seem to be the correct basis for the identification
of specific African growth bottlenecks even if these samples reduce the risks
of random results by increasing the number of observations. Since all Subsaha-
rian countries belong to the low-income group of developing countries we may
assume a good deal of hompgenity within the sample which perhaps compensates
for the smaller number of observations compared to world-wide country samples.
II. The Model
Our theoretical framework is based on the postulate that growth depends on
the availability of domestic savings as well as of the foreign capital inflow
which is mainly composed of private investments and foreign aid. This is the
4
approach which has been discussed and empirically tested in literature . How-
ever, in the context of economic growth at the very beginning of the develop-
ment path, as it is the case of all Subsaharian countries, the overall product-
/Chenery and Strout, 1965. - Rahman, 1968. - Landau, 1971. - WeiBkopf, 1972.-
2 Papanek, 1972. - Papanek, 1973, Chenery and Carter, 19737.
~ See for example ^Papanek, 1973, p. 1237.
We suppose that Galbraith's argument gains in importance if the early
stage of economic development in Africa - the first post colonial decade -
is analysed, because of the high demand for local personal and physical
infrastructure as a consequence of getting independent and the short-term
, inelastic supply of these factors of production.
See the survey article of /Mikesell and Zinser, 19737.- 3 -
ivity of capital is probably at least as essential as the amount of available
finance funds . There are some considerations supporting this hypothesis. The
probably most important one focus on the argument of indivisible lump-sum
investments in the capital-intensive sectors of physical and human infrastructure
(construction, land improvement, education and administration) at a low level
of development. These investments get fully utilized only at a later more
advanced stage of development and therefore lag in contributing to an increase
2
of overall capital productivity . Furthermore most African countries pursued
an inward-looking industrialization strategy during the early sixties which
tended to favour the production of non-tradable goods and to raise the capital-
labour-ratio.















where t_np denominates the average annual rate of real GDP growth 1960-1970,
S the average ratio of annual savings to annual GDP in percent, A the average
ratio of annual bilateral DAC-aid to GDP in percent and ICOR the average of
annual incremental capital-output-ratios during the same period.
This function can be widened up in different ways:
1) We discriminate between private and public savings (S resp. S ) each
measured as a percentage of annual GDP. This discrimination is important
because private savings can be assumed to have had a higher positive impact
on growth than public savings, first because the exploitation and export of
raw materials as the major source of savings in the small African economics
were run by private expatriates and second because public savings were
. Investigations undertaken by ^Zimmerman, 197J_/ resulted in a higher impact of
the ICORjon GDP growth of all developing countries than of the savings
ratio. ^/Hiemenz, \91jJ, disaggregating the LDC according to high-, middle-
and low-income groups complements Zimmerman's results by demonstrating a
stronger correlation between growth and capital productivity in low-income
LDC than in the other groups. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that
„ this phenomenon is to be found especially in the_ African context.
This argument runs parallel to an analysis of /Schatz, I97J_/, who stresses
an adverse economic environment as a major barrier to African economic devel-
opment instead of capital shortage. In our sense the inadequate infrastruc-
tural endowment of most African states at the beginning of the sixties
could be subsumed under the heading of adverse economic environment.likely to be squeezed by capital-intensive investments in infrastructure
and governments consumption expenditures.
2) Choosing the stepwise regression approach we additionally introduce three
variables which try to approximate a) the development level (D), b) the
importance of mineral exploitation in total economic activity (M) and c)
the role of the Yaounde association agreement (J), i.e. the preferential
EEC-treatment of francophone Africa with regard to market access and multi-
lateral aid. Whereas the first variable is expressed by the per capita GDP
in 1965, the two other ones are approximated by dummies separating the
sample into two groups of countries which either showed an average share
of the mining sector in total GDP above the 10 percent level or not or be-
longed to the Yaounde-group or not. With respect to the first variable we
hypothesize a positive correlation between growth and the GDP which,
however, is likely to be strong only if the critical level of the per capita
GDP marking the full capacity utilization of infrastructure investments has
been achieved. Since the African countries do not show wide inter-state
differentials in per capita GDP and are all clustered below the 250 US-$
level - with one exception (Gabon) - there are some doubts whether a) the
full capacity utilization of lump-sum investments could be achieved by
increasing the development level up to only 250 US-# and whether b) the
diversification potential being a function of the income level changes
significantly within an income interval of only 50-250 US-j! as it was the
case in Africa during the sixties.
As to the dummy variable for the mineral exploitation we hypothesize a
positive regression coefficient. However, there are some doubts, whether
the coefficient is significantly different from zero, first because of an
assumed strong positive correlation bettween mineral exports involving a
high element of location rent and domestic savings , so that the savings
regression coefficient absorbs much of the mineral export effects on growth
/Mikesell and Zinser, p. 18; Papanek, 1973, p. 12bJ. Second, the high
degree of capital-intensity which is inherent in mining activities may
The partial correlation coefficient between the mining dummy and
total savings amounts to 0.47 in our sample and is statistically
significant at the 99 percent confidence level.- 5 -
countervail some of the positive export effects on growth by charging the
balance of payments because of the high demand for imported technology. It
seems to be plausible to expect such a countervailing effect particularly in
those African countries which considerably expanded existing mining activi-
ties during the sixties or began to exploit mineral resources (Mauretania,
Liberia, Zaire). Consequently the positive net balance of payments effect
and hence the residual impact of mining activities on growth is likely to
be limited in Africa during the first development decade.
As to the Yaounde association scheme the African members a) may have
gained from the preferential access to the EEC-market compared to the anglo-
phone countries and b) benefitted from the multilateral EEC-development aid.
Furthermore and perhaps more relevant could be the considerable technical,
monetary and budgetary assistance granted by France especially in favour
of francophone states. Though some of the Yaounde effects of aid flows are
absorbed by the other explanatory variables such as the budgetary assistance
by public savings, the monetary assistance by private inflows or the EEC-
aid by aid flows, there may be a residual positive effect of the Yaounde-
agreement on growth.Again, however, some countervailing forces have to
be discussed.
First, an external one:the Yaounde group includes some of the poorest
countries in Africa with considerable absolute disadvantages with regard
to landlockedness and bad natural resource endowment. One can doubt whether
these external disadvantages could be outweighed by the associate status
already after the first postcolonial decade. Another perhaps more relevant
countervailing effect of the Yaounde scheme touches the dominant position
of France in its former colonies which is documented by agreements between
France and the francophone states on guaranteed export and import prices
above the world-market price level and above the prices of EEC-competitors
still even during the period of the first Yaounde association agreement
(1964-1969). If the suggestive conclusion would be correct that the French
policy towards the francophone states resulted
a) in a transfer of real resources from the African consumer to the
French exporter /Rreinin, 1973, p. 170/ and
b) gave implicite incentives to African countries to perpetuate
the "colonial" production structure,
then the Yaounde-effect would be of less importance if the association— 6 —
agreement did not erode the monopoly power of France. There are arguments
concluding that this was not the case during the sixties ^Kreinin;,
1973, p. 171; Ndongko 1973, pp. 223-229?.
3) The same set of variables as introduced above will be referred not only to
the growth of total GDP but also to that of the manufacturing sector
(tj^-jJ . Bearing in mind the low percentage of manufacturing in total
economic activity during the reference period 1960-1970 we do not except
as suggestive results as for total growth.
During the first development decade most of foreign as well as local
resources have been directed towards non-manufacturing activities,
especially in mining, construction and public administration, so that the
overall ICOR obviously does not reflect the capital-output ratios of the
manufacturing sector. We therefore introduce an alternative variable
to the unknown ICOR in manufacturing that is the productivity of the
capital stock invested by foreigners in the manufacturing sector (V) as
measured by value added in manufacturing per unit of foreign-owned
capital stock in manufacturing 1967. Although there does not exist an
exhaustive information on the ratio of foreign-owned capital to totally
invested capital in non-substistence sectors for all African countries
some corresponding data on Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria and the francophone
countries ^ILO/UNDP, 1972, p. 443; Langhammer, 1977b, p. 2; Heldt,1977a,
appendix tablejs? support the assumption that this ratio exceeded 50 percent
during the sixties and was significantly higher in francophone than in
anglophone countries. The more relevant argument in favour of the use of
V as a proxy for capital productivity, however, is that foreign-owned
firms mostly operate in the urban formal sector, whose performance can
be documented in the national accounts easier than that of the informal
sector in wKch locally-owned firms dominate. We may therefore assume that
recorded growth rates of value added in African manufacturing - particularly
during the reference period in which the statistical documentation was rudi-
mentary anyhow - were overwhelmingly linked to the performance of foreign-
owned firms.— 7 —
4) In addition to domestic savings and official foreign aid the net private
capital inflow (P) is forced in the regression equation. P is defined as
the private capital inflow n.i.e. minus investment income outflow. Since
the latter figure is substantial in the context of a "normal" African
country in which a low-interest policy - compared to the capital-exporting
industrialized country - is pursued and in which therefore foreign in-
vestors are stimulated to repatriate- investment income, the private capital
outflows often outweigh the inflows thereby reducing the explanatory power
of P.
Additionally our analysis in this case is confined to only fourteen coun-
tries covering the period 1965-70 because of lacking data on disaggregated
2 balance of payments accounts .
By adding the independent variables which have been discussed above under
l)-4) our original equation (1) is enlarged to
(2) tGDp -f (Spr, Spu, A, ICOR, P, D,M,J)
and
=f(Spr' V
1 This is especially the case in the African member states of the Franc-
Zone whose three central banks (West African-, Central African-, and
Malagasy Central Bank) have been frequently advised by the World Bank
as well as by the IMF to raise the interests up to the level of the
French capital market (Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de
2 l'Ouest, 1973).
Particularly in the context of African countries whose balances of
payments were nearly exclusively determined by the exploitation and
export of natural resources during the sixties it is indispensable
to smooth erratic fluctuations in the capital accounts by averaging
annual figures in order to specify "normal" percentages of net private
capital inflow to GDP. Only three countries (Ghana, Nigeria and Ethio-
pia) allow for the calculation of 1960-70 figures based on annual values.
For some other anglophone countries corresponding data are available
since 1963/64. As for the francophone countries additional obstacles
arise because of their monetary union with France in which intra-union
private capital flows are not accurately recorded _/Langhammer, 1977a_7.
The residual sample of fourteen countries for the 1965-70 subperiod
therefore involves a bias towards anglophone countries.- 8 -
Using the stepwise regression approach we only discuss those regression
equations whose explained variance could not be increased by adding
additional independent variables. All functions were estimated in their
linear form to obtain results which are compatible with those achieved
by other authors. Furthermore there is no a priori - argument that a
non-linear function would better approximate the cluster of observations.
In a seccsd step the regression equations will be applicated to determine
the demand for resources under the target of the UN. First Development
Decade, i^e. an annual rate of real GDP growth of 5 percent,as well as
under higher growth targets.
III. Interpretation of Regression Results
Our results presented in table 1 indicate that
- the capital productivity as expressed by the ICOR played a key role in
determining total growth during the sixties,
- the availability of local capital funds as expressed by domestic
savings had a higher positive impact on growth than foreign capital
inflow be it private or public ,
- among the total of local capital funds the private savings contributed
to growth significantly more than the public savings,
- the explanatory power of the ICOR considerably increases if the sample
is reduced to those more developed African countries whose private
2 capital inflows are known ,
- the productivity of capital invested in manufacturing by foreigners
contributed to growth in manufacturing to a less extent than the ICOR
Though we only used the bilateral aid as an indicator for public foreign
capital inflow instead of including multilateral aid, the results do not
change significantly if bilateral aid is replaced by total aid. Correspond-
ing tests for the 1965-70 period support this statement, which does not
„ surprise because multilateral aid amounted to only one third of total aid.
The improved quality of the regression equation estimated by using 1965-70
data may also be explained by a decrease of the standard deviation of all
variables over time which indicates the transition from extremely negative
performance results of some African countries during the first half of the
post-colonial decade to a "normal" growth process during the second half














































































































The complete text of the abbreviations and the sources of the variables are listed in the appendix.
» Statistically significant at the
——. 1
















































significant at the 10 percent level.-10 -
did with respect to total growth. However, this may be due to the link
of spot capital stock data for 1967 to growth results of a ten-years
period,
- the other variables discussed above such as the development level, the
mining dummy and the Yaounde membership were not significantly correlated
to growth. Particularly in the case of the mining dummy we assume that
the impact of this variable has been mostly absorbed by the significant
variables, especially by savings due to the strong correlation between
mining activities and savings. With regard to the Yaounde membership the
partial correlation coefficients suggest that, even if we would suppose
a strong positive impact of aid on growth, which in fact is hot verified
by the regression results, the Yaounde members did neither receive more bi-
lateral aid in terms of GDP nor total aid than the anglophone non-Yaounde
countries.
The emerging role of the ICOR can be underlined by estimating the change
of GDP growth which is due to the change of the ICOR and the change of
the gross investment ratio. For that purpose we regressed the differences
between the 1965-70 and the 1960-65 growth rates to the corresponding diffe-
rences of the IGOR's and the investment ratios (I/GDP).
We obtained the following equations:




DiffGDp =- 0.4244 + 0.1597 DiffI/GDp n = 26
(- 0.5801) (+1.3538) R
2 =0.07
We eliminated five countries which during the period 1965-70 had
negative ICOR's.- 1 •!. -
Hence in the African context an increase of GDP growth rates was significantly
linked to a rise of the incremental capital productivity rather than of the
investment ratio.
Comparing these results to those obtained for other developing areas or for
the developing world as a whole we find strong parallels to Zimmerman's investi-
gations for all LDC suggesting a higher influence of the ICOR on growth than
of the investment-ratio although Zimmerman did not explain the differences
of the variables for same countries at different periods ^Zimmerman, 1971,
pp. 9-l_l7.Other regionally disaggregated investigations which, however, did
not consider the capital productivity but the amount of available local and
foreign capital funds as independent variables /Papanek, 1973, p. \23j resulted
in insignificant correlations of savings and foreign inflows on African growth,
yet on the basis of only ten countries. Although our results tend to revalue
at least the influence of domestic and particularly private savings Papanek's
general statement that the impact of local and foreign capital funds on growth
is more virulent for Asian and Mediterranean countries than for the Latin
American and African states remains unchallenged.
With the exception of the results for the Latin American countries Papanek's
regression coefficients differ more significantly from zero than ours. In
this context it can be argued that the parallelism between the relatively
low savings and foreign inflow regression coefficients for the American group
and those for the African group is to some extent determined a) by the bias
2 in Papanek's sample towards small Central American and Caribbean countries
and b) by the outstanding role of exports of raw materials in small Latin
American and African countries compared to Asian states in which the product-
ion and export of manufactures increasingly gained in importance.
. The asterisks mark the significance level as indicated in table 1.
This assumption emerges out of the high number of observations for
the American group (n = 37), whereas the core of large Latin American
countries does not amount to more than a dozen countries.- 12 -
The inherent hypothesis would be that if local and foreign capital funds
mainly flow into capital-intensive exploitation of natural resources, their
impact on growth is reduced a) because of a high demand for imported technolo-
gy charging the balance of payments and b) because of either considerable
outflows of investment incomes and/or an increase of public budgetary receipts
which perhaps are suboptimally allocated compared to private capital funds.
Furthermore primary export earnings depend on external components (climate,
world supply or demand constellations, technological innovations) which may
reduce the degree of capacity utilization and hence the capital productivity
especially in those capital-intensive extractive activities in which technolo-
gically determined indivisibilities prevail. Consequently there is some
evidence that the overall IGOR contributes to explain inter-state growth
differentials in developing areas with a dominant role of exploitation of
natural resources rather than in areas with some progress in industriali-
zation. In the latter areas such as in Asia or in the Mediterranean countries
the availability of capital funds as expressed by savings and foreign capital
inflows may be of a greater relevance in explaining growth performance.
To provide some empirical evidence on the magnitude of the productivity gap
as well as on the finance gap in Subsaharian Africa we estimate the demand
for capital funds and the productivity mix under the 5 percent target of the
UN First Development Decade by using the regression equation (table 1)
t-nD = 3.7143 + 0.1349 S + 0.2260 AD - 0.3293 ICOR.
For that purpose two of the three independent variables are held constant
according to their averages calculated from those countries whose data did
not diverge by more than the standard deviation from the average of the
total sample. We thus exclude the extreme cases which are mainly the three
South African states Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland with high aid ratios
and some countries exporting mining commodities and having high savings
ratios (Gabon, Zaire, Zambia ). The third variable is designated to be the
According to S the following countries we eliminated: Gabon, Zaire, Botswana,
Lesotho and Zambia; as for the aid ratio Liberia, Nigeria, Botswana, Ethio-
pia, Lesotho and Swaziland are-extreme cases, whereas Mali, Senegal, Burundi,
Chad, CAE and^Zaire have ICOR's which considerably deviate from the African
average.- 13 -
instrument variable by which the target rate is determined. We confront the
theoretically desired figures with the actual figures of the instrument
variable and calculate the finance gap on the basis of the 1967 GDP and
repeat this procedure for the three possible constellations (table 2).
The results signify that
- in accordance to the explanatory power of the single variables the
savings gap is more relevant than the aid gap ,
- the finance gap increases over-^prppcrrtionally if African countries should
have envisaged an additional growth of only 0.5 percent above the UN-
target,
- the "optimal" mix of the ICOR and the gross investment ratio signals
a reduction of the latter ratio simultaneously with a more productive
use of capital funds.
In order to determine the relevance of either gaps in local funds or in
aid flows we applicated another method by confronting the deviations of
actual and designed growth - the latter as documented in the individual
development plans of African countries— with the deviations of actual and
designed savings ratios on the one hand and the deviations of designed and
actual aid ratios on the other hand. Since the development plans considerably
differ in the accurateness of finance targets we had to reduce the sample
2
to those Yaounde associates whose plans of the sixties were more homogenous
than those of the anglophone group and thus involved less guesswork /Kommis-
sion, 196j}/. However, the results signal a positive but statistically insigni-
ficant correlation between the deviations^:
The aid gap of 60 mill. US-# under the 5 percent target is equivalent
with a percentage of only 1.0 of total DAC-bilateral aid provided for
all developing countries in 1967 whereas the corresponding percentage
amounts to 6.2 under the 5.5 percent target.
1 Benin (1966-70), Ivory Coast (1967-70), Mali (1961-66), Mauretania (1963-66),
Niger (1967-70), Senegal (1965-69), Togo (1966-70), Upper Volta (1967-70),
Cameroon (1966-70), Chad (1966-70), CAE (1967-70), P.R. Congo (1964-68),
Gabon (1966-70). The figures in brackets denominate the plan period.
See for an extended analysis of causes of deviations between garget and_































































Estimated by the function t™ = 3.7143 + 0.1349 S + 0.2260 A - 0.3292 ICOR where t denominates the aver-
age rate of growth of real GDP 1960-70, S the average annual gross saving ration 1960-70, A the average
annual ratio of bilateral aid to GDP and ICOR the annual average incremental capital-output-ratio, both of the
same period. - b The total of 1967 GDP of the countries concerned has been taken as the reference value. -
c The desired mix of the ICOR and the gross investment ratio amounts to 2.7 and 13.5 under the target rate of
5 percent growth and 1.2 resp. 6.6 under the 5.5 percent rate, whereas the actual mix amounted to 3.0 and 14.4.
I
Source: See Appendix.- 15 -
DEV,. = - 1.2883 + 0.1199 DEVC + 0.3025 DEV. R
2 = o.l3
tGDp S A
(- 5.8738) (+Q.7477) (+0.8131) n =13
DEV = Actual minus designed growth of GDP.
GDP
DEVg = Actual minus designed ratio of annual savings to GDP
DEV. = Actual minus designed ratio of annual bilateral
aid to GDP.
Hence our assumption that instead of the availability of capital funds the
capital productivity has to be regarded as the major bottleneck factor to
growth in Subsaharian Africa still remains valid.
IV. The Determinants of Savings, Aid and Capital Productivity
A) Savings
The aspect to which we turn now has been already widely discussed in the
literature cited above and empirically analysed especially for the Latin
American countries and the whole developing world, but not yet for the total
of Subsaharian African countries. The results indicated a significant negative
correlation between the foreign capital inflow and savings as well as a
positive impact of exports of raw materials on savings. However, the conclu-
sion from correlation to causality was challenged ^Papanek, 1972, World Bank,
1975, p. 3687, because of both conceptual problems and statistical tautology;
the former because of the undue simplification which is involved in the
aggregation of different forms and origins of private and public savings
and because of exogenous factors which can lead to similar correlations
between savings and inflow as the "causality" approach suggests ; the latter
Besides the hypothesis that a short-term shortage of investment opportunities
causes a shift of foreign capital to consumption and consequently a fall of
domestic savings the "causality" approach argues that the availability of
foreign aid slows down the psychological pressure of the government to
increase saving efforts /Rahman, 19687.- 16 -
because savings in LDC are often statistically recorded as the residual
between investments and foreign capital inflow. Though within the cross-
country regression approach many of these deficiencies cannot be eliminated
we try to tackle some of them a) by discriminating between private and public
savings and b) by focusing on aid inflows instead of the trade balance as an
indicator of capital inflow and on export growth instead of GDP growth. By
proceeding in this way we take account of statistical obstacles to estimate
the private capital inflow in all African countries, which arise because of
roughly recorded intro-Franc-Zone capital flows, but also because of the
fact that in most of the African countries the annual inflow of public aid
was quantitatively more relevant than long-term private capital inflows
during the sixties. Furthermore since the characteristics of the typical
African country, low per capita income and population, do not allow for an
efficient inward-looking development strategy, the performance of the external
sector determines overall economic development and hence justifies the use
of export growth instead of GDP growth as an explanatory variable. That means
that instead of the regression equations
S =f(t_vr.T,, F), where F denominates the trade balance-GDP
(jl)r
ratio /World Bank, 1975, p. 3841
and
S =f(E, F), where E denominats the ratio of exports to GDP
/Weisskopf, 1972,- p. 37_7
we run the regression of public and private savings (S resp. S )
on the growth of exports (tEXp) .
We furthermore discriminate between mineral exporting and non-mineral exporting
countries and on the ratio of bilateral plus multilateral DAC-aid to GDP(A )
for the period 1965-70 which allows for a larger sample than for the 1960-70
period.
The results are the following:
S = 10.387 + 0.3405 t__. - 0.8753 A_, n = 18*
( 3.6448)"(1.5059) ( -4.2109) ' R = 0.58
Benin, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,














Spr = 5.2630 + 0.4199 t - 0.2253 AT
(2.1654)** (2.1771)* (- 1.2708)
S = 5.1239 - O.O7S4 tn - 0.6500 A_, pu jbAx i
(5.3048)* (-1.0354) (- 9.2263)*
In general the introduction of the mining dummy demonstrates that differences
in the saving behavior of countries exporting agricultural primary products
and those additionally or exclusively exporting minerals are not significant.
That means that the mining dummy picks up some of the effects of total
exports on savings without improving the explanatory power of the independent
variables. We therefore^concentrate t^e interpretations on the above two-fold
regression equations.
In this context, however, the results strongly support the critics against
an aggregation of private and public savings to a total savings function.
Though in both equations the familiar outcome is achieved that aid and savings
are negatively correlated, the power of the correlation differs in both cases
being higher relevant for public savings and non-relevant for private savings.
Another substantial difference is that the export growth significantly con-
tributed to an increase of private savings but not of public savings. The latter
result does not support a priori considerations that the growth of (primary)
exports besides its effect on private savings tends to raise public savings,
be it via taxation of foreign-owne*K corporation profits stemming from primary
exports, be it via export taxes or via increased profits of state-owned firms
operating in the primary sector. Apart from the obvious fact, however, that
governments savings behavior is more influenced by non-economic factors than
private savings behavior and therefore more difficult to analyse we challenge
the above-mentioned causality running from high aid inflows via a reduced
"psychological" pressure to save to a squeeze of public savings. Instead of
this it can be presumed that many African countries (probably in first place
2 the "backward" francophone Sahel—states ) are permanently faced with budget
Using the double-logged type of function the export growth coefficient
positively deviates from zero even at the 1 percent level.
Our sample is biased in favor of francophone states (12 of 18 countries)
among which are the poorest African countries.- 18 -
deficits caused either by a weak basis of taxation and/or high public expen-
ditures for infrastructure investments. Consequently foreign aid is mainly
determined to fill this gap . Hence the causality runs the other way, from
budget deficits to high aid requirements.
Furthermore, the discrepancy between Papanek's untested hypothesis that
exports of raw materials are relatively easy to tax - compared to wage or
profit incomes - and therefore facilitate higher rates of governments savings
/Papanek, 1973, p. \2bj and our results may be partly due to the low number
of African countries which exclusively rely on the exports of rent-intensive
minerals for which this hypothesis could be of greater relevance than for the
2 rather heterogenous and diffused group of exportable agricultural products .
As to the former outcome, the positive impact of exports on private savings,
we assume that business savings are more concerned than private household
savings a) because of the very low income level of the sample countries in
the sixties which restricted the income expenditure mainly to the demand for
necessary consumer goods as food, beverages, textiles and housing ^/ECA, 1973/74T
and b) because of distorted factor prices including low interest rates which
acted as disincentives to local savings and stimulated the transfer of savings
abroad. -
In general the impact of export growth on private savings in Subsaharian
Africa though being statistically relevant seems to be lower than for the
other regionally concentrated samples analysed by Papanek. We suppose that
this can be explained not only by supply bottlenecks to savings but also
by a low capital-absorptive capacity. Since African countries during the six-
ties mostly pursued an inward-looking development strategy potential investors
were probably not stimulated to shift funds to other activities than the
exploitation of natural resources or some highly protected industries, oriented
towards the small domestic market. Under these conditions the export growth
This is an important way of allocating aid in the Franc-Zone countries,
where France finances budget deficits of the poorer members, but also in
„ the South African countries Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland.
This assumption is supported by the positive but statistically insigni-
ficant correlation between the mining dummy and public savings.- 19 -
of the late sixties was obviously insufficient to allow for a level of total
savings by which the development decade target of 5 percent (DDT) could have
been achieved. If we regard the average annual total aid inflow (6.7 percent
of GDP) for the eighteen countries as exogenous then the export growth rate
being necessary to achieve the DDT-savings ratio of 8.8 percent - as document-
ed in table 2 - was 13.1 percent instead of actually 8.6 percent. Hence apart
from the low capital productivity insufficient export growth was obviously
another bottleneck to overall economic growth in Subsaharian Africa .
&>. Aid
The inflow of bilateral and multilateral aid into IDC is ruled by various
economic and non-economic aspects which depend on political and economic inter-
dependences between donor countries and agencies on the one hand and aid-
receiving LDC on the other hand. In the specific case of African LDC which
by far receive the highest amount of aid measured as a percentage of total
2
GDP ties stemming from the colonial period together with post-colonial pre-
ferential schemes (EEC-association agreement for the francophone area and
bilateral intra-Commonwealth aid agreements) mainly determine the amount of
technical assistance, budgetary, project or emergency aid. According to these
different forms total aid varies between pure emergency and distress relief
and performance-oriented aid. In this context it has been argued that aid
unlike private capital inflow is biased towards countries with a balance-of-
payments constraint Jfapanek, 1973, p. 122~7 whereas the opposing hypothesis
would stress that aid adjusts of different degrees of capital-absorptive
capacity and is therefore biased towards LDC with a better performance factor
endowment, or a higher development level /Hikesell, 1966, pp. 164-17^/. The
results of table 1 in which aid has been correlated to a performance indicator,
i.e. growth, did not provide suggestive empirical evidence in favour of one
of the hypotheses. Though bilateral aid was positively linked to growth, the
confidence level was low. Compared with Papanek's results which indicated
a considerably higher impact of aid on growth for the non-African LDC it
could therefore be argued that during the sixties aid flows to African
The partial correlation coefficient of - 0.23 between the ICOR and export
growth points at some repercussions between the two bottlenecks.
In 1971 the Latin American LDC received a 0.6 percentage of bilateral
aid to GDP. The corresponding figures for Asia amounted to 1.1 percent
and for Africa to 2.2 percent.- 20 -
countries were less efficiency-oriented and more concessionary than those
received by the rest of IDC. Given the case of LLDC which primarily include
Subsaharian countries, Papanek's hypothesis would hence gain some relevance
especially for this group of LDC. In the following we try to refine our
results a) by discriminating between bilateral and total aid where the latter
variable includes multilateral aid and b) by running regressions of aid on
performance and trade gap indicators for the total period 1960-70 as well
as for the subperiod .1965-70 for which data are available. The discrimination
between bilateral and total aid is based on the assumption, that multilateral
more than bilateral aid usually flows into large-scale projects exceeding
the financial capacity of a single donor country /Roemer, 1966/. Since these
projects include a high import content, a long maturity period and a low
short-term capital productivity we suppose that the actual performance or
the actual development level of aid-receiving LDC are more relevant criteria
for bilateral than for total aid. Supposed that this hypothesis is plausible
then the relevance of actual performance as an explanatory variable of
aid depends on the ratio of multilateral aid to total aid. This ratio amounts
to approximately one third for the average of Subsaharian countries- Hence we
do not expect different criteria in granting bilateral and total aid as
statistically significant in our sample.
Running regressions of the total aid - GDP - ratio (A ), 1965-70, and of the
bilateral aid - GDP - ratio (A^), 1960-70 resp. 1965-70, on the per capita
income in 1965 (D) as the development level proxy and alternatively on the
GDP growth (tGDp) 1960-70 resp. 1965-70, on the trade gap - GDP - ratio (F) ,
1960-70 resp. 1965-70, as the "proof of needs" indicator, as well as on the
Yaounde dummy (J) it can be shown that
- growth performance had not a decisive positive effect on aid flows,
- the Yaounde coefficient, probably due to the activities of the EEC-develop-
ment fund, turned from a negative sign for bilateral to a positive but
statistically insignificant sign for total aid,
- the Yaounde dummy absorbs, some of the effects of the per capita income
level on aid, since the Yaounde group includes the most "backward" African
countries.
The residual significant results demonstrate that although both variables, the
per capita income as well as the trade gap, are significantly correlated with- 21 -
bilaterial aid at a reasonable confidence level, the latter variable has
the greater impact which is reinforced if we run regressions of total aid.
Thus the arguments are supported that aid distribution in Africa in general
is biased towards con-tries with a foreign exchange gap and that this bias is
especially relevant in multilateral aid. The results are the following:
period 1960-70
B - 2.1053 + 0.0237 D
(1.4328) (2.2628)**
subperiod 1965-70
B = 1.9953 + 0.0232 D
(1.3236) (2.0460)**



























The opposing argument of multicollinearity between the variables does not fit
in the African Conditions of the sixties with relatively low inter-state per
capita income differentials, permanent and considerable foreign exchange gaps
of the LLDC and corresponding surpluses of some countries being at a higher
2
income level .
The argument would stress that high per capita incomes of LDC may be linked
with permanent foreign exchange gaps in the course of inward-looking
industrialization either because of an inelastic import demand for capital
goods and energy and/or because of stagnating export earnings stemming
„ from the traditional exports of raw materials.
LLDC-countries as Chad, Upper Volta, Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho, Benin,
Rwanda, CAE and Gambia were permanently - that means during the ten years
period under observation - faced with foreign exchange gaps of about 10
percent of annual GDP, whereas those countries outside the LLDC group
which mainly export minerals scored permanent trade surpluses (Liberia,
Gabon, Mauretania, Zaire, Swaziland and Zambia). The remarkable exception
of a permanent surplus country without mineral resources is represented
by the Ivory Coast.- 22 -
It seems to be a striking feature of an unchanged economic structure of
many African countries during the sixties (mostly under fixed exchange
rate - regimes vis a vis the metropolitan countries) that the number of states
with either permanent surpluses or deficits is rather high whereas only a
very small number shows fluctuations in the trade balance. The latter group
obviously had more options to finance an episodical gap either by private or
public foreign sources or by drawing down of foreign reserves than the majo-
rity group of permanent deficit countries. Our results suggest that this group
mainly depended on aid flows as a remedy to finance trade gaps because of
lacking own reserves and attractive investment potentials. In this context
it could be argued that the fixed exchange rates - regimes between African
deficit countries and their major trading partners contributed to some
extent to the lack of private foreign capital inflow because they prevented
African countries from adjusting the external value of domestic resources to
changing price-ratios between local and external factors of production. Instead
of this protection instruments were built up as a substitute for exchange
rate changes thus disencouraging foreign as well as domestic capital fund
holders to invest in other sectors than in primary activities or some local
import substitution industries . Under these circumstances it was predominantly
non-risk capital, i.e. aid flows, which filled resource gaps in post-colonial
Africa without changing the colonial production patterns in the sixties,
neither directly nor indirectly by mobilizing local and foreign risk capital.
C. Capital Productivity
The most striking outcome of table 1 was the high impact of inter.-state
differences in marginal capital productivity on inter-state growth differen-
tials. Howeverk the use of the ICOR. as a measure of overall capital producti-
vity is submitted to serious constraints among which the unknown amounts of
The "natural" disadvantages of post-colonial Africa, i.e. small domestic
markets, lack of skilled labour and entrepreneurship, and a rudimentary
infrastructure, may - together with the infant industry argument - justify
an inward-looking strategy in the non-primary sectors for a transitory
period ^Robson,Lury 1969, pp. 67-70/, but on the other hand the tendency
of local African politicians, whose interests are vested, and some bene-
fitting investors to extend this period as long as possible is rather ob-
vious apart from the of ten exculpatorily cited ''external effects" /Gttsten,
1974, p. 332, footnote 2/.- 23 -
the total capital stock and the average capital-output-ratio at the beginning
of the reference period are the most crucial ones /ECE, 1964, pp. 18-2C)/.
Hence the suitability of the ICOR as an indicator of the efficiency of capital
investment is likely to be limited. However, this argument seems to be less
valid for LDC ,€han for DC /Zimmerman, p. fj. Furthermore we suppose that in the
African scenario characterized by a low capital stock at the beginning of the
first post-colonial decade the later total economic growth has been mainly
influenced by the current gross capital formation within the same ten years
period and less by the fixed capital formation during the colonial stage .
Additionally our reference period seems to be long enough to approximate ah
average capital productivity figure.
By trying to identify the determinants of the capital productivity in Sub-
saharian Africa we first refer to findings which emerged from a world-wide
sample of LDC /Hiemenz, 1977, pp. 1~8_T« In this context it has been argued
that the relation between the ICOR and the per capita income as an indicator
of the development level is u-shaped, with falling ICOR's from>a low income level
up to a turning-point of about 400 US-# which indicates a rising utilization
degree of a technically determined and hence indivisible capital stock.
Beyond the turning-point more advanced technologies and a changing product-
ion structure towards more capital-intensive sectors cause a gradual increase
of the ICOR. Corresponding tests for our sample, however, cannot support this
argumentation, since all Subsaharian countries have to be subsumed under the
income group ranging far below the turning point. On the contrary even a
weak positive correlation between the ICOR and the per capita GDP emerges.
What seems to be more relevant as an explanatory variable for ICOR different-
ials is the discrimination between non-mineral- and mineral-exporting
countries where the latter group shows significantly higher gross investment
ratios but only marginally higher GDP growth rates. Hence we may assume that
the average capital productivity was lower in those African countries speci-
alized on the exports of minerals than in the other countries whose export
structure was determined by agricultural commodities, probably because the
former group was faced with high costs of imported physical and human capital
acting as a deterrent to GDP growth.
This statement is purely qualitative and cannot be tested empirically
-because of lacking data on the African capital stock.- 24 -
We therefore argue that in the African context instead of the per capita
income level the type of capital goods acquired and the type of economic
activity in which*the capital formation is primarily launched could provide
appropriate explanations for inter-state ICOR-differentials.
As to the type of capital goods acquired we discriminate between two main
groups, the one of residential and non-residential buildings, other construct-
ion and work (including land improvement) and the other one of transport and
machinery equipment- In general investments in the first group account;
for 50-75 percent of total gross fixed capital formation in Africa during the
sixties. We hypothesize that the ICOR tends to be higher the more the capital
formation concentrates on the first group which mainly includes capital-
intensive infrastructure investments with a low short-term capital productivity.
A test of this hypothesis, however, is impeded because only thirteen Subsaha-
rian countries provide corresponding data of at least a three-years-period in
the sixties . Splitting the data of Ghana, into two subperiods (1960-65 and
2
1965-70) and applicating a double-logged type of function , we obtain the
following equation
In ICOR = - 4.0457 + 1.2076 In C R
2 = 0.15
(- 1.2003) (1.4746) n =14
where C indicates the average percentage of gross fixed capital formation
launched in the above-mentioned first group of capital goods to total gross
fixed capital formation during the respective periods. The regression coeffi-
cient shows the hypothesized sign but is not significantly different from zero.
Apart from the low number of observations this may be explained by time-lags
between the launching of investments in this group and their impact on GDP
growth. Since the variables primarily base on the average of five years the
lag may exceed this period. Furthermore we cannot estimate differentials in
the capital-output-ratios of the single components in the first group. The
high aggregation level does therefore not permit the test of the assumption
that for example capital-output-ratios in land improvement investments differ
significantly from the ratios in construction or dwellings.
According to the UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, these countries
are Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria,
Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia.
The results stemming from the estimation of a linear function do not deviate
widely from those of the double-logged function.- 25 -
Similar data problems arise if we turn to the type of economic activity in
which investments are launched. During the sixties capital formation in
Subsaharian Africa was concentrated on the tertiary sector (wholesale and
retail trade, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage, communication and
other services') by about 65 percent of total capital formation . Though the
assumption does not seem to be implausible that capital productivity in the
tertiary sector is lower than in the other sectors and that therefore
countries whose development strategy is oriented , towards primary or secon-
dary activities show lijwer ICOR's a cross-country regression test fails
because of data shortages. Nevertheless it can be shown that in those African
countries where data are available, the amount of capital formation in agri-
culture, forestry and fishing does not all correspond to the high percentage
of these activities in total GDP. Only in one country (Kenya) the capital
formation in these primary activities slightly exceeded 10 percent of total
capital formation measured as a five-years-average, whereas in the other
countries this percentage was considerably lower. Bearing in mind that capi-
tal formation is likely to be confronted with technical indivisibilities
especially in the tertiary sector and hence provokes excess capacities in
low-income countries it can be asked whether some African countries pursued
an appropriate strategy - under growth and employment objectives - to allocate
capital funds mostly to the tertiary sector either directly by public invest-
ments or indirectly by providing incentives for private investors to concen-
trate on tertiary activities. On the other hand it is obvious that a minimum
endowment with services and infrastructure is an indispensable prerequisite
for any economic activity. It can be presumed that mainly the most backward
African states concentrated in the Yaounde-group suffered from this bottle-
neck and therefore stimulated the capital allocation in tertiary activities
during the first development decade, with consequence regarding the overall
2
short-term or medium-term productivity . Additionally other bottlenecks of
This figure has been calculated by taking the .five-years-averages of nine
countries (Gambia, Senegal, Cameroon, Kenya,Ethiopiy, Tanzania, Mauritius
and Zaire).
Though the Yaounde member states show significantly higher ICOR's than the
anglophone countries, we do not link this result to institutionally
: factors,but to the comparatively bad resource endowment of the
Yaounde countries.- 26 -
the backward countries as unskilled labour and a lack of managerial facilities
may have also influenced the productivity of capital in a negative way _/ECA,
Statistical and Economic Information Bulletin for Africa, No 4 (1973), p. 57,
footnote \3j.
V. Conclusions and Futther Questions
Our results from tracing the growth path of Subsaharian Africa during the
first development decade revealed the low capital productivity as a major
reason for lagging behind other developing areas with regard to GDP growth.
Compared to this bottleneck the availability of local and foreign capital
funds was less relevant. This seems to be an interesting deviation from other
investigations which stressed the bottleneck role of available capital funds,
be it savings, aid or foreign private capital, especially for Asia and the
Mediterranean countries. Among the various capital funds private savings
ranged next to capital productivity,whereas governments savings did not play
any role in fostering growth and were influenced by other components than
the growth of exports which were closely connected with private savings. The
most striking deviation from other investigations was demonstrated by the low
impact of aid on growth which we explained by the considerable regional
spread of aid favoring the backward African states which were permanently faced
with resource gaps. This spread was more evident in multilateral than in bila-
teral aid.
Apart from the frequently cited warnings to rely too much on cross-country
regression analysis which only "averages the past" there are, however, various
questions open to further analysis in our context. Since the interstate diffe-
rentials in ICOR could not be explained satisfactorily we may argue some general
hypotheses. Supposed that the colonial inheritance of Subsaharian Africa, as
indicated by its product set offered on world markets, by the scarcity of
human capital and by a communication net linking some import enclaves to the
outside world and isolating rural domestic resources, seriously hampered
structural changes in economic development, then it is understandable that
the majority of African states promoted lump-sum capital formation in physical
and human infrastructure causing high capital-output-ratios at a very low
income level. In addition factor price policies which were not oriented towards
alternative costs of resources may have favoured the run for formal education- 27 -
and a white-collar-job and hence reinforced the flow of human and physical
resources in private and especially public tertiary activities ^Kamarck, 1971,
pp. 77-7_9/. Whether this strategy was misleading because of fostering excess
capacities in the tertiary sector and of neglecting the employment of
domestic resources in primary and secondary activities whose short-term
capital productitivy is generally higher, cannot be answered by drawing on
one decade. If the above-cited cross-country regression analysis applied to
a world-wide sample, marks the 400 US-$ per capita income level as the turning-
point from downward to upward movements of the capital-output-ratio and there-
fore indicates somewhat of a full capacity utilization level of the existing
capital stock in low-income countries, then many African countries are fiar
from having arrived at that level even today. There is, however, some evidence
emerging from country studies that apart from an adverse natural resource
endowment different policy attitudes towards specific sectors had important
effects on the overall performance. In this context, the quite different
growth paths of the Ivory Coast and Ghana, two states with striking similari-
ties in factor endowment and size at the beginning of the development decade,
are the most frequently cited examples. Whereas the Ivory Coast pursued a
policy of outward-oriented diversification in agricultural primary and process-
ing activities encouraging private entrepreneurship in small-scale farm units,
Ghana focused on an extensive import substitution strategy, on investments in
large-scale infrastructure projects and on the creation of state farms* and
cooperatives in the primary sector . In our sample the two countries con-
tingusly appear as overachiever respectively underachiever with regard to GDP
growth and capital productivity though the Ivory Coast devoted more attention
to public investments in physical and human infrastructure during the second
half of the sixties and was therefore faced with a slight decrease in capital
productivity and though Ghana changed its economic policy in the other
direction during the same period, i.e. after the Nkrumah fall, and scored a
rise of capital productivity. An analysis of sectoral ICOR's would throw some
more light on the impact of different sectoral policies on the overall
economic performance of African states. Another aspect to be discussed separa-
tely refers to different factor price policies of African countries including
1 See /Heldt, 1977 b/ and the literature quoted there.- 28 -
the foreign exchange regimes. Though still today all African countries in
general depend on the export of primary products for which an increased
flexibility of exchange rates has less consequences than for manufactured
goods /Crocket and Nsouli, 197^/ it may be argued that changing policies with
regard to regional as well as sectoral export diversification should be
accompagnied by more flexibility in exchange rates than it was the case
in Africa during the sixties, where the francophone countries tried to strenght-
en trade relations with the EEC-partners of France and where the anglophone
countries tried to do the same towards the whole EEC. Furthermore the mone-
tary unions in francophone Africa during the whole decade and still 1966 in
anglophone East Africa were likely to be detrimental for the backward members
which tried to start a diversification policy by enforced intra-union exports
of non-traditional goods to the more advanced member states. This seems to be
obvious, because the backward states could not autonomously adjust to existing
factor price level differentials between the union members.
In general, given the high relevance of the external sector on growth perform-
ance in Subsaharian Africa, there is some evidence that the growth lag of
this developing area during the sixties as compared to other areas, can only
partly be explained by an adverse resource endowment, but to a larger extent
by national policies favouring the "big push" in capital-intensive prestige
projects as well as especially by the rigidities of strong institutional ties
between former colonies and economically stagnating -metropolitan countries in
fiscal, monetary, trade and aid affairs, thereby strictly limiting sectoral
and regional diversification strategies outside the traditional area.- 29 -
List of Variables and Sources
t_np average annual growth rate of GDP at 1970
market prices 1960-70
Source: ECA, Statistical and Economic Information
Bulletin for Africa, No. 4 (1973), E/CN. 14
SEIB/4
ICOR Incremental capital-output-ratio 1960-70,
average for years shown
Source: See above
average annual rate of value added growth in manufacturing
and electricity 1960-69 constant factor cost 1960
Source: ECA, Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa,
1970 (Part II), New York 1971
S Gross Savings/GDP at current market prices, 19J6O-7O, 19^5-70
average for years shown
Source: IBRD. World Tables 1976
S Gross Private Savings/GDP at current market prices
1960-70, average for years shown
Source: See above
S« Gross Public Savings/GDP at current market prices
P"' 1960-70, average for years shown
Source: See above
A_ Net official Receipts of Bilateral DAC-Aid/GDP at current
market prices, 1960-70, 1965-70, average for years shown
Source: ECA, Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa,
1970 (Part I), 1971 (Part I)
D GDP per capita 1967 in US-#
Source: See above
M dummy E2= countries with a percentage of mining in GDP
1965 higher than 10 percent
1= residual sample countries
V Value Added in Manufacturing ind Electricity 1967/Stock of
Foreign Direct Investments in Manufacturing at the End of 1967
Source: See above; DAC/OECD, Stock of Private Direct
Investments by D.A.C. Countries in Developing Countries
End 1967, OECD, Paris 1972- 30 -
P Private Capital n.i.e. minus Investment Income/GDP,
1965-70
average for years shown,
Source: See above; IMF, Financial Statistics*^Washington, Monthly.
J Dummy: Members of Yaounde association agreement = 2
Non-members " 1
E annual average growth rate of exports in current
US-g 1965-70
Source: IBRD, World Tables 1976
A Net official Receipts of Bilateral plus Multilateral
DAC-Aid/GDP at current market prices, 1965-^70
average for years shown
Source: ECA, Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa
C percentage of gross fixed capital formation in
dwellings, non-residential buildings, construction and
other workd (including land improvement) to total
gross fixed capital formation
Source: UN, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics,
New York, Vol. 1, annual- 31 -
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Table 1 - Growth rates of GDP, Investment Ratios, and Incremental Capital-Output-
Ratios (ICOR's) in Subsaharian Africa for years 1960-65, 1965-70, and
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